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A B S T R A C T
Successful ﬁnancing of innovation in renewable energy (RE) requires a better understanding of the relationship
between diﬀerent types of ﬁnance and their willingness to invest in RE. We study the ‘direction’ of innovation
that ﬁnancial actors create. Focusing on the deployment phase of innovation, we use Bloomberg New Energy
Finance (BNEF) data to construct a global dataset of RE asset ﬁnance ﬂows from 2004 to 2014. We analyze the
asset portfolios of diﬀerent RE technologies ﬁnanced by diﬀerent ﬁnancial actors according to their size, skew
and level of risk. We use entropy-based indices to measure skew, and construct a heuristic index of risk that
varies with the technology, time, and country of investment to measure risk. We start by comparing the behavior
of private and public types of ﬁnance and then disaggregate further along 11 diﬀerent ﬁnancial actors (e.g.
private banks, public banks, and utilities) and 11 types of RE technologies that are invested in (e.g. diﬀerent
kinds of power generation from solar radiation, wind or biomass). Financial actors vary considerably in the
composition of their investment portfolio, creating directions towards particular technologies. Public ﬁnancial
actors invest in portfolios with higher risk technologies, also creating a direction; they also increased their share
in total investment dramatically over time. We use these preliminary results to formulate new research questions
about how ﬁnance aﬀects the directionality of innovation, and the implications for RE policies.
1. Introduction
Mobilizing ﬁnance for investment and innovation in low-carbon
energy is a key challenge for climate change mitigation (Dangerman
and Schellnhuber, 2013; Grubb, 2014; Stern, 2015). Because cumula-
tive carbon emissions determine the intensity of climate change, speed
matters. Yet, fossil fuel investments continue to dwarf investments into
renewable energy (RE).1 In 2013, RE received investments of less than
USD 260 billion, which represented only 16% of the USD 1.6 trillion in
total energy sector investments (Fig. 1). Meanwhile, investment in fossil
fuels in the power sector, where they compete directly with electricity
from RE, rose by 7% from 2013 to 2014 (UNEP and BNEF, 2015).
Clearly, fossil fuels still dominate energy investment; therefore, a major
concern in the transition to low-carbon energy provision is how to
obtain enough ﬁnance to steer investments into the RE direction.
A closer look shows that the news is not all discouraging. Total
funding for RE has been rising at a remarkable rate. According to
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), the amount of RE ﬁnance
along the entire innovation chain, from research and development
(R & D) for new technologies to asset ﬁnance for full-scale power plants,
rose from USD 45 billion in 2004 to 270 billion in 2014 globally
(Fig. 2). This represents a compound annual growth rate of 18%.
Moreover, in 2014, net investment into new capacity, as opposed to
replacing depreciated assets, was twice as large for RE as it was for
fossil fuels in the power sector; this trend is forecast to continue for the
rest of this decade (International Energy Agency, 2015). Therefore,
although investment in RE remains low relative to that in fossil fuels,
the trajectory is a positive one.
The focus on achieving a greater amount of ﬁnance has diverted
attention from what is being ﬁnanced. Since ﬁnance ﬂows towards
concrete projects and ﬁrms, ﬁnance always—unless distributed uni-
formly—creates a direction towards areas and technologies that these
organizations promote. This may result in a skewed distribution of in-
vestment in RE, so that some areas are over-ﬁnanced, while others are
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under-ﬁnanced (relative to average). Lack of attention on the re-
lationship between ﬁnance and directionality is surprising because it is
widely recognized that a diverse set of RE technologies is desirable, for
at least two reasons. Firstly, with a wide portfolio, if innovation is
unsuccessful in one area, not all eggs are in one basket (Grubler, 2012);
secondly, a diversiﬁed energy supply increases resilience of the energy
system and hence energy security (Stern, 2015; Stirling, 2010b).
There has been much research linking the research and commer-
cialization phase of the innovation chain to speciﬁc ﬁnancing needs.
High-risk upstream research is widely understood to require public ﬁ-
nancing due to the characteristics of public goods (Arrow, 1962). Si-
milarly, venture capital ﬁnancing helps to solve the asymmetric in-
formation problem in the “Valley of Death” which requires carrying
technologies from proof of concept to commercial scale (Auerswald and
Branscomb, 2003). The public ﬁnance and venture capital that solve
these “market failures” are shown in Fig. 2.
However, less studied are the diverse types of ﬁnance in the
downstream phase of innovation: deployment and diﬀusion. And yet,
more than two thirds of total RE ﬁnance went to asset ﬁnance for de-
ployment of utility scale RE power plants, also shown in Fig. 2, and so
can aﬀect directions in innovation.2 Channels of inﬂuence work both
directly through the ﬁnance committed favoring a certain technology,
and indirectly through the eﬀects of increasing returns to scale and
learning by doing, where feedback loops from deployment to upstream
innovation can create technology lock-ins (Arthur, 1989). Yet the lit-
erature on the ‘directionality’ of innovation, which has looked for ex-
ample at the way that policy measures can aﬀect directions of in-
novation either knowingly or unknowingly (Stirling, 2010a), has
ignored the role of ﬁnance in this process.
In this paper, we link the literature on the directionality (and
pathways) of innovation, with the literature on the relationship be-
tween ﬁnance and innovation. We study how diﬀerent types of ﬁnance
create directions in RE deployment. Our aim is to understand whether
and how ﬁnancial actors diﬀer in their investments, thereby achieving a
more granular understanding of the ﬁnancing process and direction
within it. We look at two types of directions: towards speciﬁc
technologies (such as onshore or oﬀshore wind) and towards sets of
more or less commercialized and hence risky technologies.
We consider the aggregate categories of “public” and “private” ﬁ-
nance, which are typical distinctions in both theoretical and applied
work about RE innovation (Popp, 2011; Veugelers, 2012). We also
study 10 more disaggregated ﬁnancial actors active in deployment (in-
cluding private banks, public banks, private utilities, and public uti-
lities). This perspective diﬀers from the conventional focus on the
sources of ﬁnance, e.g. diﬀerent types of equity, debt and grants (Kerr
and Nanda, 2015), and is connected to a growing body of literature
(reviewed below) that demonstrates diﬀerences in ﬁnancing behavior
between ﬁnancial actors.
Our disaggregated analysis is based on data from the BNEF database
of deal-level global RE asset ﬁnance, from 2004 to 2014, as well as
aggregate BNEF data on public banks. We distinguish ﬁnancial ﬂows
from particular organizations to particular technologies. We draw on
both ownership and industry classiﬁcations in the BNEF database to
categorize ﬁnancial actors. We update and correct the classiﬁcation
extensively using information from organizations' websites and reports.
We also create a heuristic risk measure based on the literature on
technology and market risk (Szabó et al., 2010), and Ernst and Young's
(2015) Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Index, which we ap-
plied to measure and compare the risk exposure that ﬁnancial actors
have, given their investment portfolio across technologies and coun-
tries. We analyze technology direction using entropy-based measures of
portfolio balance, and risk direction by the share of ﬁnance ﬂowing to
high risk investments.
Our results suggest that not all sources of ﬁnance have the same
impact on RE. Some ﬁnancial actors skew their investment to a subset
of technologies (e.g. public utilities towards oﬀshore wind), while
others spread their investments more evenly over a wide portfolio of
competing technologies, creating technology directions. We also ﬁnd
that public actors not only invest in far riskier portfolios, inﬂuencing
the risk direction, but also account for an increasing share of total in-
vestment.
Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the literature on the relationship between
ﬁnance and the direction of innovation, both generally and for RE.
Section 3 introduces the data and our methods of analyzing diﬀerences
in investment behavior. Section 4 discusses results on technological
directions created through the skew of portfolios of private and public
ﬁnance as well as 10 ﬁnancial actors. Section 5 discusses results on risk
directions through varying risk exposure of actors, and examines pat-
terns of ﬁnance in four high-risk technologies. Section 6 concludes by
discussing the implications of our results for climate change policy, and
for future research on ﬁnancing innovation. Two appendices provide
details on the construction of our database and the risk index, respec-
tively.
2. Finance and energy innovation
2.1. Financial actors and innovation directions
Joseph Schumpeter placed ﬁnance at the center of his theory of
innovation, as providing the funds necessary for the entrepreneur to
spring into action. However, he focused on only one type of ﬁnance:
banks (Schumpeter, 1939, 114), and did not elaborate on the question
of whether diﬀerent ﬁnancial actors' characteristics might impact what
innovation is being ﬁnanced, thus creating directions. The Mill-
er–Modigliani theorem, which states that sources of ﬁnance (equity or
debt ﬁnancing from any actor) do not matter to ﬁrms and hence do not
aﬀect the real economy (Modigliani and Miller, 1959) has further de-
tracted attention away from distinguishing between types of ﬁnance in
innovation. In subsequent literature, the only types of actors typically
singled out were “government” and “venture capitalists” (Hall, 2002).
The job of the former was to overcome underinvestment in research due
to the positive externality of knowledge (Arrow, 1962); the purpose of
Fig. 1. Global investment into energy by destination.
Source: (International Energy Agency, 2014).
Fig. 2. Global investment into RE by area of ﬁnance.
Source: (UNEP and BNEF, 2015).
2 Small distributed capacity deals for residential and business rooftop solar modules
of< 1 MW make up another 25%. A typical household rooftop solar module has a ca-
pacity of 1–4 kW. This study focuses on utility scale asset ﬁnance due to data availability.
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the latter was to overcome information asymmetries that led to un-
derinvestment into product development by new ﬁrms or ‘ventures’
(Hall and Lerner, 2009). In this literature, ﬁnance takes a passive role
regarding what is being ﬁnanced.
More recent work has placed greater emphasis on diﬀerent types of
ﬁnancial actors and how they may impact the characteristics of the
ﬁrms and technologies they are ﬁnancing. Thus, ﬁnancing by the public
sector also beyond the R &D stage (Mazzucato, 2013) in areas like
space, health and low carbon technology has resulted in the creation of
whole new sectors, often through mission-oriented projects that were
actively decided upon by those who provided the ﬁnance (Foray et al.,
2012). In some countries, ﬁnance has been provided via innovation
agencies like DARPA3 and/or tools for ﬁnancing of ﬁrms via procure-
ment, such as the SBIR4 in the USA. In countries such as Brazil, China,
Germany, Japan, and in the European Union, important ﬁnancial actors
were public banks, providing patient ﬁnance for projects that aim to
address “great challenges” such as climate change mitigation and
adaption (Mazzucato and Penna, 2016; Schapiro, 2012) and promoting
certain industries (Shimada, 2017; Griﬃth-Jones and Cozzi, 2016;
Mazzucato, 2016b), jointly with a network of other public institutions
(Shimada, 2017).
In private sector, certain actors were also pushing particular sectors
or technologies; indeed, banks like Chemical Bank got their name from
their role in ﬁnancing the chemical sector (Mazzucato and Wray, 2015).
But what gets ﬁnanced may equally be inﬂuenced by what is neglected
by certain actors: it has been noted that venture capital has often
avoided very early seed investments, and has also been biased towards
particular areas like IT and biotech, only recently getting interested in
green-tech (Lerner, 2012). Some studies have examined how short-term
speculative ﬁnancial actors have aﬀected science-based industries
(Lazonick and Tulum, 2011; Pisano, 2006). Others have studied how
interactions between diﬀerent types of ﬁnance may aﬀect sectoral de-
velopment. For example, Owen and Hopkins (2016) looked at the way
that the interactions between venture capital and the stock market,
aﬀected the biotechnology industry diﬀerently in the US and the UK.
Therefore, the prevalence of one or another type of ﬁnance will privi-
lege certain technological areas, certain levels of risk and consequently
particular areas of innovation, and in the process induce directions into
the innovation process. Yet, while the foregoing studies have examined
the diﬀerent characteristics of types of ﬁnance, they have not in-
vestigated how these characteristics may inﬂuence the direction of in-
novation.
Conversely, literature concerned with directions has paid little at-
tention to the role of ﬁnance in setting these directions. The direction-
ality literature (Stirling, 2010a, 2011) in innovation studies has stressed
the importance of recognizing the multiple pathways and directions
that innovation can take, so that policies explicitly recognize the forces
inﬂuencing them, including the risk of sub-optimal policies and lock-in.
This strand of literature has focused on the role of power relations, such
as those embodied in public ﬁnancing of innovation (e.g. the use of
science advice and how decisions are made). However, it has ignored
how the distribution and characteristics of private and public ﬁnancial
actors can aﬀect the direction of change. Similarly, economic studies
considering path-dependence in innovation (David, 1985) and the role
of feedback eﬀects in creating ‘lock-in’ (Arthur, 1989) have not in-
cluded the way that ﬁnancial institutions can aﬀect this dynamic. The
present study is motivated by this missing link between the type of
ﬁnance and the directionality of innovation.
2.2. Financial actors and direction in renewable energy
The literature on RE ﬁnancing, both modeling and empirical, has
historically given more attention to suﬃcient investment in R & D than
to downstream ﬁnancing of deployment (Popp, 2011; Sagar and van der
Zwaan, 2006). Yet, a key gap identiﬁed in RE more recently is the lack
of ﬁnance for downstream capital-intensive high-risk projects
(European Commission, 2013; Veugelers, 2012; Zindler and Locklin,
2010), kindling a growing literature that studies actors in the deploy-
ment of RE technologies. One strand focuses on diﬀerent risk appetites
of types of ﬁnance. For example, Ghosh and Nanda (2010) have argued
that the capital required for asset ﬁnance of the capital intensive RE
power plants is typically an order of magnitude larger than that which
venture capitalists have been willing to supply for technology devel-
opment (see also Gaddy et al., 2016), and too risky for banks (Kalamova
et al., 2011). Evidence for diﬀerences in risk perception between in-
dividual investors has been furnished for a sample of European in-
vestors by Masini and Menichetti (2012). While these studies do not
distinguish types of ﬁnancial actors, Bergek et al. (2013) studied three
types of power plant builders in Sweden – utilities, farmers, cooperatives
– and highlighted how diﬀerent builder types may have various non-
proﬁt maximization objectives that inﬂuence their investment choices.
The results connect with conceptual work by Langniss (1996), who
identiﬁed six ﬁnancial actors (anonymous, industry, large utility, house
owner, municipality, energy community) and discussed how each type's
appetite for risk varies with their motives for investment.
Another strand focuses on the impact of public policies on private
deployment ﬁnance. Studies that used aggregate data to examine the
impact of innovation policies by government aimed at upstream in-
novation on private RE deployment (Johnstone et al., 2009; Popp et al.,
2011), and at private downstream activities (Eyraud et al., 2013) found
that these policies do mobilize private ﬁnance. Using micro data at the
asset deal level (mostly from BNEF, as in the present study), public
policies were found to mobilize ﬁnance from institutional investors
(Polzin et al., 2015) and to have a positive eﬀect on cross-border merger
and acquisition activity (Criscuolo et al., 2014). Certain types of po-
licies are more conducive to investment in RE innovation than others
(Veugelers, 2012), and may induce varying amounts of venture capital
investments into RE companies (Criscuolo and Menon, 2015). Only two
studies have distinguished direct public investments (Cárdenas
Rodríguez et al., 2014; Haščič et al., 2015). They found that both public
investments and policies have a signiﬁcant positive impact on private
investment. In addition, Cárdenas Rodríguez et al. (2014) showed that
direct public investments are taking place for those technologies, where
other public policies have had little eﬀect on mobilizing private ﬁnance.
As for directions, the directionality literature has considered the
energy sector, but focused on the interplay of agency and structure and
the inﬂuence of power without distinguishing ﬁnance (Stirling, 2014).
Meanwhile in economics, discussion of the direction of technical
change in energy (distinguishing fossil and RE directions) incorporates
an inﬂuence of ﬁnancial actors neither in the phase of R & D (Acemoglu
et al., 2016) nor in that of deployment (Jaﬀe et al., 2005).
2.3. Our study in the context of the literature
In sum, certain types of investors have been more likely than others
to provide the capital-intensive, high-risk, patient ﬁnance needed to
achieve innovation, and there is some insight into diﬀerences between
public and private actors. However, the patterns of ﬁnance in deploy-
ment – who ﬁnances, and what – for RE technologies are not well un-
derstood. Although there are conceptual arguments for why diﬀerent
ﬁnancial actors may display varying behavior, and for why some areas
or technologies may be ﬁnanced more than others, creating directions,
quantitative empirical studies have not followed up and investigated
these hypotheses at a disaggregated level. We know that the landscape
of RE ﬁnance consists of a heterogeneous set of actors (Buchner et al.,
3 Defense Advanced Projects Agency (Abbate, 1999). See discussion of DARPA's role in
US innovation in Mazzucato (2013).
4 Small Business Innovation Research Program, which provides early-stage ﬁnance to
companies, through procurement (Keller and Block, 2013).
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2015), but we do not know much about their role and how this might
aﬀect the direction of the evolution of RE.
The present paper attempts to ﬁll this lacuna by studying the het-
erogeneity in RE ﬁnancing decisions of diﬀerent public and private ﬁ-
nancial actors and how these aﬀect the technology and risk directions
of innovation. For technology directions, since there is no evolved
theory beyond the public/private divide regarding how ﬁnancial actors
should diﬀer in favoring certain areas, we simply investigate the hy-
pothesis that ﬁnancial actors diﬀer in their portfolio composition. The
technology classiﬁcation is imposed by our data. For the risk direction,
Ghosh and Nanda (2010) proposed a classiﬁcation of RE investments
that comes closest to associating particular ﬁnancial actors with parti-
cular phases in RE innovation based on expert interviews. Fig. 3 is an
adaptation of Ghosh and Nanda's results: a division of labor in RE ﬁ-
nancing whereby the development of new, high-risk technologies that
require small amounts of capital is funded by venture capital, while the
deployment of low-risk technologies occurs via existing energy ﬁrms
with bank debt through project ﬁnance. Ghosh and Nanda left the
nature of ﬁnancial actors carrying out high-risk technology deployment
unclear but suggested that not all types of ﬁnance are to be found in the
upper right quadrant. With our focus on the capital intensive deploy-
ment phase, we focus on the upper to quadrants and investigate the
hypothesis that only a subset of actors is active in ﬁnancing ‘high-risk,
high capital intensity’ technologies.
Our goal is to better understand whether ﬁnancial actor types show
diﬀerent investment patterns and how the characteristics of ﬁnance can
aﬀect the nature of investment patterns. Given the rising number of RE
investments, we hope that studying this dynamic will move the policy
question beyond the quantity of ﬁnance and more towards the quality.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Data
Our study is global in scope, covering the actor and technology
patterns of asset ﬁnance for the planet's RE power plant deployment
over the period 2004–2014.5 We use a rich dataset that we constructed
from three diﬀerent BNEF asset ﬁnance databases (of sponsor, lead
arranger, and syndicated lender participations), and one database with
organization characteristics (BNEF, 2015b). We improved the quality of
the data by adding information from a dataset on aggregate state bank
ﬁnance (BNEF, 2014a) and from extensive research of publicly
available sources (news or organizations' reports) about speciﬁc deals
and organizations. Our ﬁnal dataset presents asset ﬁnance for utility
scale (> 1 MW capacity) power generation in terms of individual in-
vestors' contributions to individual deals for newly built RE power
plants. Small distributed capacity must be excluded as there is no deal-
level data. The details of the dataset construction are provided in
Appendix A.
We distinguish investment ﬂows to 11 diﬀerent technologies, which
are listed with their shares in Table 1. Cumulatively, half of asset ﬁ-
nance supported onshore wind power plants, followed by 18% for
crystalline silicon photovoltaic (c-Si PV) module power plants, which
reveals a clear direction of ﬁnance towards those technologies. All other
technologies received< 10% of total investment each. We dis-
aggregated technologies more than typical analyses, which highlights
the heterogeneity in terms of ﬁnance received between technologies
within broader technology areas, such as c-Si PV and other PV tech-
nologies.
We distinguish 10 diﬀerent ﬁnancial actors: six private and four
public, and an 11th unclassiﬁed actor. Private investors are split into
three non-ﬁnancial and three ﬁnancial types that diﬀer by their func-
tion with respect to the energy sector. The non-ﬁnancial types are en-
ergy ﬁrms (component manufacturers, project developers, and a few
fossil fuel ﬁrms with investments in RE); utilities; and all remaining
non-ﬁnancial companies, which we labeled “industrials”.6 The ﬁnancial
types are commercial banks; non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms (such as private
equity ﬁrms and pension funds), which we labeled institutional in-
vestors; and not-for-proﬁt investors such as foundations or co-opera-
tives.7 We split the public investors into government agencies (which
include a small number of research institutes) and three types of state-
controlled or state-owned entities that match their private counterparts:
state banks, which include state-owned investment funds; state-owned
utilities; and other non-ﬁnancial state-owned companies.8 Finally, we
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(existing firms/bank debt)
Boundary of the present study: asset finance
Fig. 3. Risk-capital intensity classiﬁcation of RE ﬁnance.
(Adapted from Ghosh and Nanda, 2010.)
5 The data comprise 39,135 participations in 28,395 unique asset ﬁnance deals. BNEF
estimates that coverage is upward of 80% of all deals in the period covered.
6 Seventy-seven percent of the investments in the dataset made by energy ﬁrms come
from companies whose main market exposure is in RE; the remainder are typically fossil
energy companies. Only 14% of investments in the dataset were made by companies
classiﬁed in other sectors are from those whose main market is in RE; these are biofuel
producers that are not classiﬁed in the RE sector but with ‘industrials’.
7 The non-proﬁt investors include a small number of non-ﬁnancial cooperatives that
are able to ﬁnance large projects included in asset ﬁnance.
8 A company is state-controlled if it is stock market-listed but the government or its
agencies retain a controlling stake. To be state-controlled we used the conservative es-
timate of share ownership of> 50%. An example is the French utility EDF, where the
state owned 84.9% of the share as of December 2015 (EDF, 2016, 487, Table 7.3.8).
Often, governments retain control with much smaller shares, by having preferential
voting rights or golden shares. We use the term “state-owned” to include companies that
are state-controlled.
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added investments by unclassiﬁed investors to the “private investors”
category where necessary.
Any interpretation of the data must account for substantial amounts
of missing data with respect to investors' characteristics, and yet these
are the most comprehensive data available that distinguish the actors
behind ﬁnance ﬂows. We improved data quality as follows. Firstly,
shares of actors were missing, so unless we were able to ﬁnd shares
from publicly available data – for example, from European Investment
Bank reports – we imputed shares by distributing asset value equally
across participants.9 Secondly, there were signiﬁcant gaps and errors in
the ownership and industry classiﬁcation of actors. We manually added
ﬁnancial actor information for several dozen unclassiﬁed investors
based on information found on organization websites and corrected the
classiﬁcation for over 100 already classiﬁed organizations.10 Even after
these corrections, however, 15% of all invested funds could not be at-
tributed to any ﬁnancial actor. Thirdly, lenders are underrepresented
because many deals do not report their debt sources; in such cases,
BNEF attributes the entire deal to the sponsors who own equity in the
project. This can be veriﬁed with aggregate RE ﬁnance statistics that
show state banks invest signiﬁcantly more in asset ﬁnance than the
deal-level data reveals (BNEF, 2014a). Accounting for these invest-
ments doubles the share invested by the state banks (and subtracts an
equal percentage from other investors that beneﬁt from this debt ﬁ-
nance).11 Because the deal-level dataset omits these important cred-
itors, the detailed portfolio analysis cannot make use of this correction
and inevitably overstates the role of (mostly private) sponsors.12 With
these caveats in mind, Table 2 lists ﬁnancial actors with their cumu-
lative shares.
3.2. Methods
We characterized diﬀerences in the RE portfolios in which ﬁnancial
actors invest. We distinguished between three dimensions – size, port-
folio skew, and risk-taking – which translate into two directions. Skew
provides a measure of the technological direction towards a subset of
technologies in the portfolio of an investor. Weighted by its size, this
translates into a technology direction of the aggregate portfolio. Risk-
taking provides a measure of the portfolio's risk direction to high-risk
technologies. We also documented the consequence for technologies of
portfolio diﬀerences by analyzing how technologies diﬀer in the
amounts of investments they receive from all actors, and from what
distribution of actors.
In order to delineate portfolios, we subdivided the investment ﬂow,
x, into 11 technologies indexed by j= 1,…,11 over which a portfolio
can spread. To delineate investors, we take the 11 functional ﬁnancial
actors indexed by i= 1,…,11 explained in the data description. In some
cases, we summed over private and over public ﬁnancial actors to
analyze investor categories. In the dimension of time, we divided the
dataset into three periods: pre-crisis (2004–2008), “Great Recession” or
crisis (2009–2011), and post-crisis (2012–2014). Where useful, we
distinguished between annual investment ﬂows. Then the size of the
investment ﬂow of actor i in technology j during time t is denoted as xijt.
To measure skew, we considered shares of investment and deployed
standard tools from information theory, which are used widely in
analysis of diversity and inequality. Assuming that all technologies are
equally diﬀerent from each other, we identiﬁed the skew in the port-
folio of actor i by calculating its Shannon entropy, H (Shannon, 1948),
which is deﬁned as
∑= − = … =
=
H p p i I tlog , 1, , , 1, 2, 3it
j
J
ijt ijt
1 (1)
where =pijt
x
x
ijt
it
is the share of investment ﬂowing to technology j in i's
portfolio during time period t and ∑ == p 1j
J
ijt1 for given i and t. The
Shannon entropy is maximal if the share of investment in each tech-
nology is equal, and minimal if all investment goes into only one
technology. Hence, calculating the entropy of a portfolio gives an in-
verse measure of a ﬁnancial actor's direction of investment across
technologies: zero entropy translates into investment directed only to-
ward one technology, maximum entropy translates into the greatest
balance of investment between technologies and an absence of any
direction. Between these extremes, a lower entropy signiﬁes that an
actor directs its investment toward particular technologies, without
revealing which technology or technologies it favors. Since entropy is
independent of portfolio size, it can be compared across actors. We
further divided Hit by maximum entropy =H logmax 111 , where each of
the 11 technologies receives an equal share of investment. The quotient
=Hitn
H
H
it
max , is normalized entropy, H
n, and lies on the interval zero–one.
Maximum entropy has been used in ﬁnance theory to evaluate optimal
or ‘maximum entropy’ diversiﬁcation given certain constraints on in-
vestments (Bera and Park, 2008). We note the analogy in the measure,
Table 1
Technologies, ranked by share of investment received in 2004–2014.
Technology Share of ﬁnance received, as a %
1 Onshore wind 49.2
2 Crystalline silicon PV (c-Si PV) 18.1
3 Biomass and waste 8.5
4 Conventional or ﬁrst-generation biofuels 6.7
5 Oﬀshore wind 6.7
6 Solar: Concentrating Power (CSP) 3.7
7 Other PV (thin ﬁlm, CPV) 2.5
8 Small hydro 2.2
9 Geothermal 1.4
10 Advanced or second-generation biofuels 0.7
11 Marine 0.2
Table 2
Financial actors' share in cumulative ﬁnance provided over the period 2004-2014.
Category Actor (and abbreviation) Share of ﬁnance provided in
%
Private Energy ﬁrms 11.3
Private utilities (Priv. utilities) 17.1
Industrials 10.4
Commercial banks (Banks) 11.7
Institutional investors 7.2
Charities/not for proﬁt (Charities) 0.8
Public State banks 15.0a
State utilities 12.6
Other state corporations (State
corps)
4.4
Government agencies (Gov.
agencies)
2.5
Unclassiﬁed Unclassiﬁed 7.6a
a After corrections using aggregate state bank statistics (BNEF, 2014a). State banks
provide 7.6% of disclosed deals and 15% are provided by unclassiﬁed investors.
9 Details in Appendix A.
10 Corrections included changing the 62% government-owned State Bank of India from
a private “quoted company” to a state-owned enterprise and changing the industry
classiﬁcation of the World Bank Group from the “consumer discretionary” sector to the
“ﬁnancials” sector.
11 We estimated that 15% of the state banks' undisclosed portfolio ﬁnances large
hydro, based on reported large hydro investment volumes (Louw, 2013), and that 70% of
the remaining portfolio ﬁnances new-build, large-scale assets, as opposed to reﬁnancing
or small-scale investment. The resulting ﬁgures tally with the KfW's reported RE ﬁnance
provided for businesses (KfW, 2014, 77, 2015, 99).
12 For instance, there are 6194 equity ﬁnancing entries for China in deals that do not
show any debt and sum to USD 308 billion. However, the state bank deployment data
shows that this equity volume veils around USD 25 billion in undisclosed RE loans by the
China Development Bank during 2007–2013 alone. When aggregating investments into
public and private categories, we added undisclosed state bank investments to the public
total and subtracted it from the unclassiﬁed investors, the remainder of whose invest-
ments are counted in the private category.
M. Mazzucato, G. Semieniuk Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
5
but emphasize that we evaluate observed historical diversiﬁcation
across multiple individual units within one ﬁnancial actor rather than
computing decision rules for individual investor portfolios.
We also calculated the direction of the total investment, HI, by
considering the share technologies have received in the market port-
folio, pjt. This gives the aggregate direction, but may cancel out in-
dividual portfolio directions. Since we would also like to know the
behavior of the sum of ﬁnancial actor directions, rather than the pooled
direction, we expanded on entropy with a measure used in the in-
equality literature. In particular, studies of occupational segregation
following (Theil and Finizza, 1971) have used entropy-based measures
such as the Theil Index to evaluate the contribution of individual units
to city or industry-wide segregation. With ﬁnancial actors instead of
indicators such as race or gender, and technology instead of occupation,
the Theil Index, T, can be readily used for summing over ﬁnancial ac-
tors' directions.
∑ ∑= − =
= =
T
H
p p p p t1 log , 1, 2, 3t
t
J
i
I
it
j
J
jt ijt ijt
1 1 (2)
where pit is the share of ﬁnancial actor i in total investment that weights
the ﬁnancial actor's direction, and technology skew is weighted by the
share the technology receives in total investment, pjt. The index is
normalized by dividing through its maximal value = ∑=H p plogJ i
I
it it1 ,
which assumes no direction within investor portfolios. Again, a value of
one means no direction within any investor portfolio, whereas zero
means all ﬁnancial actor portfolios invested in only a single technology.
The Theil Index sums over the directions of ﬁnancial actors within the
total portfolio, enabling a comparison of directions over time weighted
by portfolio size.
Finally, ﬂipping i and j indices in Eqs. (1) and (2), we also computed
the normalized entropy of investment reaching a technology (Hjtn) that
reﬂects how concentrated investors are in ﬁnancing that technology's
deployment; the overall concentration of investors using overall en-
tropy HJ; and the technology Theil Index, characterizing the investor
concentration summed over technologies. To analyze the importance of
ﬁnancial actors in individual technologies further, we also computed
the contributions of investors to growth in these technologies,
=
− −gijt
x x
x
ijt ijt
j (t−1)
1.
This leaves a measure of risk. A deﬁnition of risk is inherently
subjective (Fischhoﬀ et al., 1984), yet here we consider the compara-
tively well-deﬁned ﬁnancial risk of return to investors on the assets they
ﬁnanced. The risk of individual RE assets depends on factors speciﬁc to
the power plant site, information of the investors about contractors, and
many other undisclosed factors, and is subject to the investors' own
perception (Masini and Menichetti, 2013). One expression of these
idiosyncratic, undisclosed, and subjective factors is the required rate of
return for corporate ﬁnance decisions, the internal rate of return for
project ﬁnance sponsors, and the interest rate for loans. Knowledge of
these data would allow a detailed risk analysis after controlling for
national diﬀerences in capital markets, country risk, and interest rates.
For our asset ﬁnance data, however, the rates of return or interest
remain undisclosed. What we do know is the technology ﬁnanced up to
a certain level of detail and the country of investment. There are 42
diﬀerent technological categories in the dataset and 164 countries,
permitting the use of risk categories of “technology”, “market,” and
“country” risks. We used the common method of constructing a risk
index by identifying risk in each category and aggregating it into a one-
dimensional index (MacKenzie, 2014). We ﬁrst created a unidimen-
sional index of technology and market risks, which are often positively
correlated (Hartmann and Myers, 2001), of “low-risk”, “medium-risk,”
and “high-risk” investments. We then adjusted the riskiness for the
country risk, and assumed that individual asset ﬁnance risk deviations
are distributed as white noise. The resulting risk measure is relative
with reference to the dataset: the risk of investing in one asset is high
relative to that of investing in another.
Technology risk can be deﬁned as the “technology problems” as-
sociated with the lack of knowledge about the parameters that de-
termine “performance, cost, safe operating latitudes, or failure modes”
(Hartmann and Lakatos, 1998, 32). As a technology is deployed more
often, the data on frequency and severity of technical failure grows and
hence uncertainty regarding technology problems falls. One important
source of information is whether power plants live for their projected
lifetime (often 20–25 years with RE power plants), hence young tech-
nologies where few or no power plants have been completely depre-
ciated yet have a higher risk. Our estimates were informed by a review
of assessments of the technological riskiness of our 11 technologies in
the scientiﬁc literature.
Market risk for assets is typically deﬁned as a dispersion of returns
around mean (expected) returns (Markowitz, 1952), the sources of
which comprise interactions of operational, ﬁnancial and asset valua-
tion aspects operating at diﬀerent time scales in energy markets
(Denton et al., 2003). Absent return ﬁgures, we relied on estimates of
market risk based on growth in market share (Tietjen et al., 2016). We
use the estimates in Szabó et al. (2010) for 2009 and extend them in
time based on relative levels in levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) per
unit of energy produced. LCOE divides the total capital expenditure,
cost of capital, cost of fuels (for biomass), and maintenance cost by the
expected units of electricity produced over the lifetime of the power
plant. We assumed that a diﬀerence in LCOE favors the cheaper tech-
nology in capturing market share and hence having a lower market risk.
Our estimates were informed by annual and quarterly time series esti-
mates of LCOE for each technology.
The analysis of the technology risk literature review and LCOE es-
timates for each technology are in Appendix B. Table 3 summarizes the
resulting unidimensional measure of historical relative risk. Most
technologies display a stable low, medium, or high level of risk over
time, but the risk of PV solar energy technologies (numbers 3 and 4)
falls during the period. Albeit heuristic, our characterization of risk is
more thorough than any we have found in the literature.
Country risk is deﬁned as the regulatory risk about continuation of
government policies that inﬂuence the proﬁtability of RE asset ﬁnance
and other country-speciﬁc ﬁnancial risks. In this category, we have
relied on the comprehensive evaluation in the Renewable Energy
Table 3
Technology risk classiﬁcations 2004–2014.
Technology Sub-technology Risk
Wind
1 Onshore Low
2 Oﬀshore High
Solar
3 Crystalline silicon
(PV)
High (2004–2006), medium
(2007–2009), low
(2010–2014)
4 Other PV Thin ﬁlm PV High (2004–2009), medium
(2010–2014)
Concentrator PV
(CPV)
High
5 Concentrated Solar
Power (CSP)
High
Biofuels
6 First-gene-ration
fuels
Low
7 Second-gene-ration
fuels
High
Other technologies
8 Biomass and waste Incineration Low
Other biomass
technologies
Medium
9 Geothermal Medium
10 Marine High
11 Small hydro Low
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Country Attractiveness Index (RECAI) published by Ernst and Young
(2015) for every quarter from 2004 to 2014 for 40 countries; the in-
dicator is deﬁned on an interval, making it possible to distinguish be-
tween more than only three categories. To account for regulatory risk,
we represented low, medium, or high risk from Table 3 for any in-
dividual asset, n, by the numbers rn = 1/6, 1/2, 5/6 and added the
country risk score, which ranges from −1/6 to +1/6. More detail
about the RECAI and how it is used here can be found in Appendix B.
Letting country circumstances shift risk only by a fraction of the spec-
trum reﬂects the view that policy is not the only variable determining
the risk of an investment (Wüstenhagen and Menichetti, 2012). Hence,
any actor's portfolio has a risk exposure of between 0 (low) and 1
(high), depending on the share it invests in high-risk and low-risk
technologies in certain countries. The risk exposure R of the investment
portfolio of type i for year t is calculated as the weighted average
∑= + = … = …
=
R
x
r x c i t1 ( ), 1, ,10, 2004, ,2014it
it n
N
nt int nt
1 (3)
where n is the index of assets invested in, rnt the technology and time
dependent risk indicator, weighted by the ﬂow of ﬁnance invested by
ﬁnancial actor i into asset n, xint, and shifted up or down by the time
varying country risk score c. While this is only a heuristic approxima-
tion, the ordinal nature of the measure makes it robust: there is no
dispute that investment in an onshore wind asset in a country with
stable policies is less risky, on average, than investment in relatively
untested oﬀshore technology in a country prone to swings in its policy
support; ﬁnancial actors that invest most of their funds oﬀshore should
have a higher risk exposure than those focusing on onshore invest-
ments.
4. Diﬀerences in portfolio size and skew
4.1. Investor category size
We begin the discussion of our results with diﬀerences in size be-
tween public and private investor categories. Although splitting asset
ﬁnance into public and private ﬁgures hides variety within each cate-
gory, and we ultimately aim to distinguish ﬁnancial actors more ﬁnely,
the public–private split is useful for two reasons. First, discussions
about RE ﬁnance are largely informed by market failure theory, which
associates the public sector mainly with research and development. The
split of deployment ﬁnance into private and public investments checks
whether the public also has a role downstream. Second – perhaps due to
the sway market failure theory holds over the analysis of innovation
ﬁnance – the elementary statistic of a split of the share of public in-
vestments in asset ﬁnance is not available for this timespan, not even in
the ﬂagship publications of global RE ﬁnance trends (Buchner et al.,
2015; UNEP and BNEF, 2015).
The left-hand panel of Fig. 4 shows the evolution of annual total
investment of public and private investor categories over time. Both
time series grow rapidly, then level oﬀ. However, the public series
grows for longer, reﬂecting a dramatic shift that took place from an
asset ﬁnance market supplied in 2004 to 90% by private ﬁnance to a
market with almost equal splits between private and public sources in
2014. The decisive year was 2009, when public investment rose while
private investment fell due to the impact of the Great Recession, which
led to a stable overall asset ﬁnance, but a sea change in its composition.
In other words, since 2009, public actors have supplied well over a third
of global RE asset ﬁnance, and in some years almost half.
Although our analysis focused on the global level, we singled out
China, since the most important change over time in total RE ﬁnance
was that country's rise.13 From 2004 to 2014, China's share in asset
ﬁnance rose from 8 to 46%. This poses a challenge for the analysis of
ﬁnancial actors because China's company ownership structure is rather
diﬀerent from that of the other countries in the dataset. China has an
especially large proportion of state-owned enterprises; therefore, the
results for the world may be skewed towards the Chinese case. For that
reason, we recalculated the public and private investments, excluding
asset ﬁnance made in China, in Fig. 5, right panel. This panel shows that
although the volume of public investments outside China caught up less
with private ones from 2009 onwards, public sources accounted for
no< 30% of total investments in every year after 2008. In particular,
public sources recorded a growth of 230% from 2006 to 2014, while
private investments shrunk by 12% over the same period. As a result,
even in the more private actor-oriented economies of the OECD, which
comprise most of the investment in the right hand panel of Fig. 4, public
sources of ﬁnance have been playing a pivotal role in stabilizing the
investment volume.
These results are striking because they contradict the theoretical
view that downstream innovation phases like deployment are outside
the scope of direct public intervention. The empirical split of ﬁnance
between public and private actors after 2008 is similar to that for R & D
in the RE sector (BNEF, 2015c). The prescription in market failure
theory for public monies to ﬁnance only upstream R&D is far removed
from reality. However, these results also show that without massive
increases in public spending, investment in RE would have been lower
in 2014 than before the ﬁnancial crisis. Needless to say, it is ultimately
the cumulative investment rather than the level of investments in a
particular year that matters. Yet, except for 2011, no year saw higher
private investment than 2008, and the private high point in 2011 must
be seen in the context of government stimuli, which we discuss in
Section 5. Hence, in spite of widespread energy sector privatization and
public sector austerity, public investors are playing an increasingly
important role in ﬁnancing the deployment of RE technologies and are
the only reason that RE asset ﬁnance has experienced any growth at all
between the onset of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis and 2014.
4.2. Financial actor size and skew
At the level of ﬁnancial actors, we analyze both size and portfolio
skew, but reduce time to three periods in order to reduce complexity
and average over lumpy individual investments. These periods are: pre-
ﬁnancial crisis, crisis with government stimuli, and post-stimulus.
Table 4 shows the shares in total investment and the portfolio entropy
of each actor. The last two rows display total investment, entropy of the
global portfolio, and the Theil Index. All ﬁgures are expressed in per-
centages. Looking ﬁrst at shares, ﬁnancial actors all had diﬀerent shares
but never> 20%. Energy companies, institutional investors, and both
commercial and state banks had stable shares, while all other types saw
growth or decline by more than one-third of their ﬁrst period's ﬁnance
ﬂow. However, while the remaining private investors' relative portfolio
size declined, public investors increased theirs, causing public investors
as a category to grow. Indeed, while all private ﬁnancial actors had
smaller shares in the post-crisis than in the pre-crisis period, all public
ﬁnancial actors had larger ones. Moreover, all public actors grew their
share between any two periods, with the only exception being gov-
ernment agencies, which reduced their crisis stimulus activity (more
below). These results not only show how ﬁnancial actors diﬀered in
their investment size and its evolution over time, but also that, for
companies in the utilities industry, it makes a great diﬀerence whether
they are privately or publicly owned, that is, who does the ﬁnancing
(the qualitative result holds when excluding investments made in
China). The same is true for commercial and state banks once the
missing state banks investments are accounted for, doubling the state
bank share to almost 20% in the third period. Hence, whether an or-
ganization is publicly or privately owned has an important bearing on
the evolution of ﬁnancing volume, regardless of the exact functional
actor type.
13 In ongoing further research we are considering national patterns and how they are
inﬂuenced by national policies.
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Financial actors also diﬀer in the skew of their portfolio. All utilities
had a remarkably low entropy and thus strongly skewed portfolio;
government agencies held by far the most balanced portfolio. State
banks invested in the second-most balanced portfolio, closely followed
by institutional investors and industrials, while commercial banks and
energy companies and other state corporations had relatively skewed
portfolios. These diﬀerences in skew are robust to the method of
measurement; we have conﬁrmed the ranking of portfolio skew using
the Stirling (2007) diversity index, which gives a smaller balancing
weight to spreading a portfolio over similar technologies.14 Although
this perspective does not reveal the direction in which portfolios are
skewed, the results clearly show that ﬁnancial actors have a varying
propensity to direct their investments to only subset of technologies.
Total portfolio skew is similar to the median ﬁnancial actor skew
and ﬁrst rises then falls. This is not obvious, as very unbalanced ﬁ-
nancial actor portfolios can balance out when pooled (in the case of one
investor ﬁnancing only wind and the other only solar, their combined
investment would be balanced). Thus, the direction created by in-
dividual investors is translated into overall direction. The Theil Index,
with its opposite ﬂuctuation, gives the additional insight that the while
overall investment was most balanced during the crisis, the sum of
investor skew was biggest in the crisis period; this suggests that ﬁ-
nancial actors steered toward fewer technologies, but that these pre-
ferred technologies diﬀered between ﬁnancial actors. However, despite
an increase in the Theil Index post-crisis, the overall entropy was lowest
in the most recent period, suggesting an increasing direction towards a
Fig. 4. Volume of annual public and global private asset
ﬁnance (left panel) and excluding China (right panel).
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Fig. 5. Exposure to risk of annual public and private
asset ﬁnance for global investments (left panel) and
excluding investments made in China (right panel).
Table 4
Share in total investment, entropy of portfolio of each ﬁnancial actor, and total invest-
ment, total “portfolio” entropy and Theil Index for three periods. All ﬁgures except total
investment are expressed in percentages.
2004–2008 2009–2011 2012–2014
Financial actor Share Entropy Share Entropy Share Entropy
Energy ﬁrms 12.0 57.6 10.6 63.2 11.6 51.9
Priv. utilities 18.0 43.4 19.6 59.9 13.7 46.9
Industrials 14.1 64.5 9.8 77.9 9.0 61.8
Banks 11.4 54.9 10.3 64.5 11.3 62.7
Institut'l
investors
6.2 62.3 4.9 75.1 6.9 63.3
Charity 1.2 66.3 0.9 74.9 0.4 64.7
State banks 7.5 66.3 8.0 76.8 9.2 70.9
State utilities 6.4 47.8 14.1 34.8 16.7 43.8
Other state
corps
2.0 49.2 5.0 63.9 6.1 51.9
Gov. agencies 1.6 75.8 3.9 86.4 1.8 77.5
Unclassiﬁed 19.5 68.1 12.7 68.8 13.1 53.5
Total USD
379bn
66.8 USD
420bn
70.3 USD
407bn
60.5
Theil Index 12.0 11.5 13.0
14 Thus, diﬀerent PV technologies are more similar to each other than PV and marine
technologies for instance. See Stirling (2010b) for a dendrogram depicting RE technology
similarities.
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subset of technologies, which we examine next.
4.3. Consequences for technology ﬁnance
The previous analysis showed that there is a diﬀerent skew in in-
vestors' portfolios, but not toward which technology this skew directs.
We conclude our analysis of size and skew diﬀerences by showing how
the amount and composition of ﬁnance ﬂowing to technologies diﬀered
as a consequence of the diﬀerences in ﬁnancial actors' ﬁnancing be-
havior.
Table 5 displays the same indices as Table 4 but for technologies
that receive ﬁnance from a distribution of investors. The shares re-
ceived by technologies are much more disparate than the shares con-
tributed by diﬀerent actors. Entropies are high compared to investor
portfolios and, since they are normalized, are directly comparable with
the latter. This suggests that most actors skewed their investment to-
ward the same technology – onshore wind, and later on also c-Si PV –
giving these technologies a dominant share in the mix. Total entropy (of
investor shares in total investment) was consistently higher than that in
any individual entropy, showing that diﬀerent ﬁnancial actors did drive
diﬀerent directions that partially canceled each other out in the ag-
gregate.
There is no clear trend over time of an increase or decrease in en-
tropy. The Theil Index again shows that technologies received invest-
ment from a less diversiﬁed set of sources during than they did before
or after the crisis. As for the evolution of shares over time, only two
technologies – c-Si PV and advanced biofuels – increased their share
from the crisis to the post-crisis period. This contributes to the new
direction of ﬁnance not only toward onshore wind but also PV, which
together received almost 80% of total ﬁnance in the most recent period.
To sum up the results in this section, ﬁnancial actors diﬀered in size
and public actors became increasingly important, both as a group and
individually. Types also diﬀered in their portfolio composition, with
some types investing in more directed portfolios than others. This was
reﬂected in diﬀerent technologies showing diﬀerent sources of ﬁnance
and an increasing share of ﬁnance received by only two technologies:
onshore wind and c-Si PV. All of this conﬁrms that ﬁnancial actors
diﬀer in their tendency of creating technology directions both in how
balanced their portfolios are and in which particular direction they go,
if their portfolio is skewed.
5. Diﬀerences in portfolio risk
5.1. Investor category risk
While private ﬁnance has been greater in size, public ﬁnance has
provided more high-risk ﬁnance. This is most easily seen by returning
to the private and public investor categories. The left-hand panel of
Fig. 5 depicts the risk exposure of public and private actors in every
year. Private exposure to risk hovered consistently around 15%, but
peaked in 2009–2011, during the crisis. Meanwhile, public risk-taking
ﬂuctuated around a higher 20% in most years; therefore as public actors
increased their share in investment, the overall share of high risk in-
vestment rose. Before interpreting the diﬀerence between more gran-
ular actors, we must investigate the crisis period further.
The special character of the crisis period, 2009–2011, was already
observed in terms of portfolio size and skew. The Great Recession also
saw large government stimuli, many of which went towards RE. In
2009, during the Great Recession, an additional USD 38 billion was
committed by governments to boosting investment in RE, and much
more went to other types of “clean technology” in the wake of national
Keynesian stimulus packages (Robins et al., 2009). Most of these funds
were spent during the 2009–2011 period. There was a large uptick in
government share in the crisis period observed above, as well as a large
increase in state bank ﬁnance, not captured in the deal-by-deal data
(Louw, 2013). However, other measures boosted private investment
appetite without public funds not reﬂecting in our asset ﬁnance data,
for instance through grants and loan guarantee programs (Mundaca and
Richter, 2015). Therefore, although we cannot analyze causality, it
would be plausible to relate the higher risks taken by private ﬁnance
between 2009 and 2011, at least in part to the contemporaneous gov-
ernment stimuli; further evidence for this is analyzed in Mazzucato and
Semieniuk (2017).
Apart from the special crisis period, public risk-taking was con-
sistently higher than private risk-taking in most years. This diﬀerence is
made clearer by again excluding investments made in China in the right
plot of Fig. 5. The private risk exposure is then slightly higher and si-
milar in trend. However, the public risk exposure is entirely diﬀerent
without Chinese state-owned enterprises. From an initial level of
around 30%, public risk exposure followed a rising trend to almost
50%.
Multiplying risk exposure by total ﬁnance, high risk investments
were ﬁnanced to three quarters by private actors until 2008, while al-
most half was ﬁnanced by public actors in 2009. Subsequently the
public share saw an increasing trend, to end at 56% of all high-risk
deployment ﬁnanced by public actors with and 58% without invest-
ments made in China in 2014. On average, publicly owned ﬁnancial
actors clearly had a greater “risk appetite” than privately owned ones
and thus provided a direction towards ﬁnancing high-risk projects.
5.2. Financial actor risk
We repeat the time series depiction of risk exposure at the level of
ﬁnancial actor risk exposure in Fig. 6, distributed over four plots: for (1)
private non-ﬁnancial and (2) ﬁnancial actors, for (3) public non-ﬁ-
nancial actors and for (4) public banks and government. The entire plot
shows that levels and trend of risk exposure were heterogeneous, with
risk exposure ranging from< 10% to over 50%. Looking more closely
at private actors, all have relatively constant trendless risk exposure,
interrupted by crisis period upward spikes. On average, ﬁnancial or-
ganizations took on more risk in their investment portfolios, with the
exception of industrials. The portfolio riskiness of ﬁnancial actors was
also more volatile, partly due to lumpy investments in high-risk CSP
and oﬀshore wind technologies. Although a number of small high-risk
taking investment funds were included in the institutional investor
bracket, banks invested in a riskier average portfolio than institutional
investors. In the right panel, too, public banks have ﬁnanced a riskier
Table 5
Share in total investment of each technology, entropy of its investor contributions, and
total investment, total investor contribution entropy and technology-Theil Index for three
periods. All ﬁgures except total investment expressed in percentages.
2004–2008 2009–2011 2012–2014
Financial actor Share Entropy Share Entropy Share Entropy
Onshore 47.7 87.6 48.0 87.4 46.1 89.1
Hydro 7.1 58.9 2.9 85.5 1.2 83.1
Conv fuels 17.2 74.7 4.0 73.4 1.1 71.7
Biomass 13.0 82.2 9.1 87.4 5.5 91.5
c-Si PV 8.3 82.9 16.5 90.9 31.9 88.6
Geothermal 1.3 80.6 1.6 89.4 1.0 87.4
Other PV 0.2 73.2 3.6 86.4 2.9 82.1
Adv fuels 0.8 71.1 0.6 68.6 0.9 68.7
Oﬀshore 2.2 70.9 8.1 79.9 7.2 76.5
CSP 1.9 63.6 5.6 80.0 2.3 85.7
Marine 0.3 29.7 0.1 70.5 0.0 67.3
Total USD
379bn
89.5 USD
420bn
93.0 USD
407bn
92.7
Theil Index 14.2 13.3 15.8
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portfolio than nonﬁnancial state-owned companies; however, removing
investments in China by non-ﬁnancial state-owned companies clearly
shows that public non-ﬁnancial institutions in the rest of the world
invested into the highest risk portfolios.15 Moreover, their portfolio
became more risk-taking over time, as did that of state banks.
Comparing the plots in the upper row reveals a sharp divide be-
tween private and non-Chinese public non-ﬁnancial institutions. The
former invest heavily in deploying low risk technologies and the latter
invest strongly in high-risk assets. Public banks only became more risk
taking than commercial banks by 2011. Until then, the risk proﬁle of
commercial and state banks was similar (with the caveat that half of
state bank investments are undisclosed and therefore cannot be as-
signed a risk index). Government agencies maintained a consistently
high-risk proﬁle; meanwhile, institutional investors, seen as the un-
tapped reserve for future investment growth (OECD, 2015), had one of
the least risk-taking proﬁles overall.
These results clearly show that ﬁnancial actors build heterogeneous
investments portfolios also in terms of risk exposure. Among private in-
vestors, commercial banks and industrials take on riskier investments,
while state-owned non-ﬁnancial corporations outside China are the most
likely to take risks. The results conﬁrm innovation theory in that public
actors invest in high-risk ﬁnance; however, they also show that distin-
guishing ﬁnancial actors at a more granular level than “public” and “pri-
vate”may yield new insight into RE ﬁnance by associating a risk direction
with particular ﬁnancial actors. While the hypothesis that certain types of
ﬁnance do not invest in high-risk deployment at all cannot be conﬁrmed, it
is clear that only a subset of ﬁnancial actors are pushing back against a risk
direction only to low risk investments. The remaining subsection explores
four high-risk technologies in more detail to show the main ﬁnancial ac-
tors that drove their expansion or decline.
5.3. Contributions to high-risk technologies
Underneath the risk-taking lies a direction towards certain RE tech-
nologies. The only four technologies that are high-risk throughout are
oﬀshore wind, CSP, marine, and advanced fuels. Looking at which ﬁ-
nancial actors set the direction toward them provides a more granular
perspective on investor diﬀerences. Fig. 7 stacks time series of investment
volumes for the three largest actors by cumulative ﬁnance and the sum of
other investors in these technologies. The top-left plot shows that private
and state utilities and state banks have, together, invested> 70% of cu-
mulative investments into this sector, and an even higher percentage in the
years before 2009. In CSP, the three largest ﬁnancial actors – commercial
banks, non-ﬁnancial non-energy ﬁrms, and state banks – invest two-thirds
of the total, and almost all of it before 2008; the major spike in 2010 is due
mainly to government agencies' one-time investment. In marine technol-
ogies, where the total investment is almost two orders of magnitude lower,
the dominance by a few investors is even more pronounced, with the top
three – state utilities, government, and energy ﬁrms – providing 80% of all
funds. The share of 80% is also achieved by the three top investors into
advanced fuels: energy ﬁrms, non-energy non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, and state
banks.
Another way to analyze this is to consider contributions to growth of
the investment. Table 6 shows that the top ﬁnancial actors also drive
the change in investment over time, with more than half of growth or
decline in investment attributable to single investors. The table also
Fig. 6. Time series of ﬁnancial actor portfolio risk
exposure.
15 The series in the other panels barely change when investments in China are re-
moved, locating the Chinese speciﬁcity in the size and skew towards low-risk onshore
wind in their state-owned companies.
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shows that investors can have contradictory dynamics in their portfo-
lios. Thus, state banks and state utilities grow their investments in
oﬀshore and CSP in the post-crisis period, but their increase is more
than counterbalanced by the decline in investments of all other types. In
the case of marine, the decline in investment by state-owned utilities is
stronger than the growth by all other actors. In advanced fuels, growing
investments by energy ﬁrms and state banks overwhelm the declining
trend in other ﬁnancial actors.
These results reinforce the low entropy results for the high-risk tech-
nologies in Table 5 and illustrate that the amount of ﬁnance a particular
high-risk technology receives depends largely on only a few ﬁnancial ac-
tors; so does the cumulative investment and the experience and ability to
bring down costs. Moreover, most ﬁnancial actors are only strongly active
in one or two high-risk technologies; hence, they are pushing particular
directions within RE, with the most notable exception being state banks.
The less risky technologies (except hydro) display a much more balanced
distribution of ﬁnancial actors, and total investment volume also varies
more strongly over time for high-risk technologies than for low-risk ones.
On one hand, it is not surprising that higher-risk, lower-volume technol-
ogies have fewer investment types and more volatility in their investment
amount. However, it is also important to highlight that which actor type
allocates ﬁnance to particular technologies matters most during the high-
risk deployment stage for setting directions, and that some ﬁnancial actors
are more active in setting this direction than others (we counted state
banks in three technologies and energy companies, industrials, and state
utilities twice).
6. Conclusion and policy implications
In this paper, we have used BNEF asset ﬁnance data between 2004 and
2014 and a heuristic risk measure to study heterogeneity in ﬁnancial ac-
tors in the RE sector. We have analyzed diﬀerences in size, skew, and risk
exposure of the portfolios that ﬁnancial actors invested in; we have also
considered how technologies diﬀer in the amount and composition of ﬁ-
nance they receive. We have found that diﬀerent ﬁnancial actors con-
tribute to varying technology directions: some have balanced portfolios,
while others have strongly directed ones toward particular technologies,
where particular actors may have a disproportionate inﬂuence on a par-
ticular technology's deployment. Actors also diﬀer in their risk direction
towards high or low-risk technologies, with private ones favoring low risk
much more than public ones, and individual high risk technologies pushed
mainly by just two or three ﬁnancial actors. Public actors have also
Fig. 7. Stacked volumes of annual investments by top
three investors in four high-risk technologies; the
lower plots have a y-axis scale an order of magnitude
smaller.
Table 6
Contributions to growth in crisis period (CG 1) and in post-crisis period (CG 2) of in-
vestment into four high-risk technologies of the top three ﬁnancial actors of other ﬁ-
nancial actors and total technology investment growth rate. All ﬁgures in percentages.
Financial actor CG 1 CG 2 Financial actor CG 1 CG 2
Oﬀshore CSP
Priv. utilities 129.6 −25.8 Industrials 72.1 −19.3
State banks 26.1 4.6 Banks 47.6 −24.8
State utilities 37.3 12.8 State banks 0.5 8.4
Others 111.5 −5.4 Others 106.2 −24.8
Total 304.5 −13.9 Total 226.4 −60.6
Marine Advanced fuels
Energy ﬁrms 2.5 0.1 Energy ﬁrms −11.4 20.0
State utilities −83.3 −4.4 Industrials 0.7 −2.5
Gov. agencies 3.9 0.8 State banks 8.0 19.2
Others −1.8 −0.8 Others −10.0 −2.8
Total −78.7 −4.3 Total −12.7 33.9
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accounted for an increasing share in overall investment. We have argued
that it is important to understand the directionality of innovation as this
can aﬀect the success of innovation and resilience of the RE energy system,
so that options remain open in case innovation in a narrow set of tech-
nologies stalls.
While our results must take into consideration the gaps in the data and
the heuristic nature of the risk index, the patterns suggest that emphasis
should move from the total amount of ﬁnance to its composition by ﬁ-
nancial actors and areas of investment. We now discuss four high-level
implications for policy and sketch the need for further research.
First, our results suggest that it is important to understand the
consequences of diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial investments for the direc-
tion of RE innovation. If policies favor a subset of ﬁnancial actors, these
actors will come with their particular priorities of ﬁnancing. Examples
of such actor-speciﬁc policies include attempts to incentivize institu-
tional investors to invest more in the RE sector (OECD, 2015), the
creation of ‘funds of funds’, and the creation of new actors such as a
state bank or the privatization of utilities. Understanding the historical
directions these actors have created may help explain the impact such
policies will have on a national technology mix.
Second, and conversely, the design of technology-speciﬁc policies
beneﬁts from gathering knowledge about the heterogeneity in ﬁnancial
actors. An awareness of the historical trend of which types of ﬁnance have
invested in that technology may help create incentives for that type of
ﬁnance. For instance, if there is a preference for concentrating solar power
plants, it may be useful to know that, since the ﬁnancial crisis, these have
mainly been ﬁnanced by state banks, industrial ﬁrms, and government
agencies. Creating funds of funds in this case may not change much. These
considerations become particularly salient for new, high risk technologies,
and may be important for other sectors, too.
Third, more attention needs to be given to the coordination of dif-
ferent types of ﬁnancing in the deployment phase. Policy makers tend
to focus only on a “market failure” justiﬁcation of public policy. In the
case of RE this has resulted in the correction of market failures in the
upstream (R &D) phase through public agencies, and the use of VC for
the product development phase (VC), but equal emphasis should be
placed on the deployment phase. Yet, to coordinate policies this might
require a market shaping and market creating strategy that goes beyond
the market ﬁxing framework (Mazzucato, 2016a). The use of “mission-
oriented” policies (Foray et al., 2012) to both catalyze a new sector and
to ensure the new technologies are fully diﬀused and deployed, as
happened with the IT revolution, could be useful for the green tech
sector (see also Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2017).
Fourth, these results show more generally that the type of ﬁnancial
actor matters, and at a more ﬁnely grained level than just “private” vs.
“public”. Awareness that ﬁnance can create directions – whether planned
by policy makers or not – is an important point to heed when designing
policies. To map the eﬀects that policies have on the direction and not just
the amount of ﬁnancial funds before implementing policies, will help
prevent surprises and lock-ins later. Mazzucato and Semieniuk (forth-
coming) discuss the importance of public ﬁnancing in shifting investment
in the energy sector towards the direction of clean technologies.
Our results are preliminary and future research might extend this
work in several dimensions. One important theoretical question is why
ﬁnancial actors have diﬀerent investment risk proﬁles, and how this
translates into particular types of portfolio choices which go beyond the
risk analysis of portfolio theory (Merton, 1969; Ross, 1976). Private
actors may behave diﬀerently if motivated in their investment choice
by the perception of future proﬁtability in areas, especially based on the
evidence that what matters is not current proﬁts but expectations about
future growth (Dosi and Lovallo, 1997). Or put another way, business'
animal spirits are endogenous to public investment (Dow and Dow,
2012; Mazzucato, 2016a). It is important to understand how public
policies or investment choices aﬀect these perceptions.
Another question is how public and private investments interact and
whether the ability of public investment to leverage private investment
diﬀers for diﬀerent types of public ﬁnancial institutions. This can pro-
vide insights into diﬀerent types of crowding-in processes, that are being
assumed for example in the Juncker plan for investment-led growth
(European Commission, 2014) and how they diﬀer across technologies
and/or periods in the technology life-cycles. Tying these results to di-
rections may enable developing more precise policy advice on how
directions in RE innovation are being and can be inﬂuenced by the
decisions of ﬁnancial actors. One obstacle to a more precise quantita-
tive analysis of ﬁnancial actors' roles is the large amount of missing data
on investor participations as opposed to deal values. A Bayesian missing
data analysis may go some way to improving our understanding of
“who is doing what” quantitatively. Ultimately, however, better data
reporting and collection will have to be implemented alongside more
narrowly focused research.
Appendix A. Dataset construction
We constructed the dataset by ﬁrst merging three databases that list equity, lead and syndicated debt ﬁnance for asset ﬁnance deals (BNEF,
2015b). We created the value of each investor's participation in an asset ﬁnance deal by splitting deal values between equity and debt and allocating
the share of the value to the participating investors. The raw BNEF asset databases record deal value, debt value, and investor shares, but a portion of
the data are missing. Although 55.8% of deal values are missing, BNEF imputes a deal value to each project. 77.2% of participant shares are missing
and BNEF does not impute them. In order to attribute a share to every disclosed investor anyway we ﬁrst reduced missingness to 23%, by assuming
that whenever only a single equity sponsor without debt is disclosed, this deal is entirely ﬁnanced by this sponsor (the problems this creates for
underrepresenting undisclosed debt are discussed in the main text). Second, where more than one sponsor/creditor is disclosed and share values are
missing, we distributed the unknown shares of each deal's equity equally between sponsors while assuming, whenever creditors are disclosed, that
the share of debt in the deal is equal to the average share of debt in the disclosed data, with a gearing ratio of 66%. We then imputed debt shares by
distributing the imputed debt value equally over creditors.16 With all missingness removed, the date of deal closure identiﬁed the time of asset
ﬁnance, and closure dates were coarse-grained into annual or multi-annual intervals. Finally, we trimmed the dataset of all investments in the
“reﬁnancing” and “acquisition” categories to only count newly added capacity.
Next, in order to create ﬁnancial actors, we merged our asset dataset with the database classifying investors. The latter distinguishes investors
according to their ownership structure and their industrial classiﬁcation. Ownership structure distinguishes between publicly listed and privately
owned companies, non-proﬁt institutions, government agencies, etc. The Bloomberg industry classiﬁcation system is similar to the Global Industrial
Classiﬁcation System (GICS), which has 10 sectors, 24 industry groups, and is further subdivided at the “industry” and “sub-industry” levels. We then
used ownership structure to identify privately or publicly owned organizations. Within public ownership we further distinguished “government
16 Equal share imputation may misrepresent single investors' contributions. An example is the Gemini Oﬀshore Wind Farm debt ﬁnancing from 17 actors, for which BNEF does not
provide shares. Equal imputation implies a share of< 6% for each participant. However, other sources showed that the European Investment Bank provided 30% of the total EUR 3
billion, and the remainder was split between 16 private banks and utilities (EIB, 2014). An improved share allocation may use information about investor behavior in other deals, that
could be implemented in a Bayesian missing data analysis.
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agencies” from corporations, and within private ownership we distinguished for proﬁt from not for proﬁt organizations. Finally we used the GICS
sectors “energy”, “utilities”, “ﬁnance” and all other sectors, and within the ﬁnance sector, the industry groups “Banks” and all other industry groups,
to create ﬁnancial actors within public and private categories that distinguish organizations according to their function, while grouping as many
diﬀerent forms and industries as possible to reduce complexity.
Appendix B. Risk measure construction
B.1. Technology and market risk
We used studies of technology risk and time series of LCOE estimates for market risk to assign a risk indicator to each of eleven technologies for
each year from 2004 to 2014. Existing comparative classiﬁcations of either technology or market risk for RE are scarce. We started with the
exception in Szabó et al. (2010), who estimate both technology and market risk for 6 technologies as low, medium or high and added the remaining
technologies from the more comprehensive (Altran, 2011) study by comparing their riskiness with those given by Szabo et al. and assigning them the
same low medium or high risk class. We then used level and changes in component prices and levelized cost of energy (LCOE) data from BNEF
(2014b, 2015a), the Fraunhofer Institute (2013) and the World Energy Council (Salvatore, 2013), and for earlier years up to 2009 and 2010 from the
IPCC special report on RE (Mitchell et al., 2011), as well as additional information about technological maturity (detailed below), to extend the 2009
risk classiﬁcation backward and forward to every year between 2004 and 2014. We distinguished sub-technologies where there were signiﬁcant risk
diﬀerences within one of our 11 technologies, such as between thin-ﬁlm PV and concentrator PV.
The resulting classiﬁcation in Table 3 in the main text is created as follows. Onshore wind ﬁnancing was low risk in all years, with signiﬁcant
capacity already installed in 2004, and prices often competitive with fossil energy source (Salvatore, 2013). Oﬀshore wind was a high-risk in-
vestment throughout; until 2014, it continued to experience technical setbacks and diﬃculties, such as connecting power plants to the grid (KfW,
2014, 2015, p. 77 & 100), and the oldest large-scale oﬀshore wind farms have not yet reached the end of their estimated lifetime (Ho et al., 2016).
Meanwhile, levelized costs remain signiﬁcantly above those for onshore and fossil-fuel-generated power (BNEF, 2015a).
In the solar sector, c-Si PV's component price fell by almost 90% over the 11 dataset years, leading Szabo et al. to classify c-si PV as low risk as
early as 2009. The thin-ﬁlm PV alternatives dropped to medium risk in 2010, with a similar cost structure, but less information about technological
performance. Only concentrator PV remains high-risk throughout, as this technology is only now transcending the pilot stage and costs remain high
relative to other PV technologies (Phillips et al., 2015). Concentrating solar power (CSP) is high-risk in every year. The high level of LCOE hardly
decreased between 2006 and 2012 in most region (Stadelmann et al., 2014). A surge in US installations in 2011 was driven by public grants, and
private loans underwritten by public loan guarantees, because the risk was too high for other types of ﬁnance (Mendelsohn and Kreycik, 2012).
Moreover, technology designs are still in major ﬂux (European Commission, 2013).
We divided biofuels into ﬁrst- and second-generation fuels, where the latter were high-risk and the former (fermentation of edible plants into
ethanol, and transesteriﬁcation for biodiesel) low-risk, following the usual classiﬁcation in the literature (Schwaiger et al., 2011; Sims et al., 2010).
Biomass was split into low and medium risk in order to distinguish the widespread use of incineration plants from those using other, less experienced
technologies (Balat, 2009). Marine energy was high-risk throughout, as these technologies remained in the pilot stage in 2014, and levelized cost far
exceeded that of any other technology in the sample (BNEF, 2015a). Geothermal technologies were medium risk investments. There is a long history
of building commercially viable geothermal power plants (Fridleifsson, 2003), but the need to commit large amounts of capital early on and build
site-speciﬁc power plants kept individual investments risky (BNEF, 2014b). Small hydro was low-risk in all years, as it is a well-tested technology
(Mitchell et al., 2011) and its LCOE tended to be among the lowest of all technologies (BNEF, 2015a).
B.2. Country risk
The Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Index (RECAI) is compiled by Ernst and Young (2015) and ranks countries in every quarter for the entire
dataset period according to their investment climate, political stability, ability to connect power plants to the grid, priority of RE over other low-carbon
energy forms, electricity prices, and RE support policies for various RE, all of which are weighted according to the importance of diﬀerent RE technologies
in the electricity mix. Country scores vary between 25 (worst) and 75 (best). The RECAI started with 17 countries in 2004 and ranked 40 countries by
2012. In order to translate the RECAI into a country risk factor that is additive to the above risk index, we centered the RECAI around zero and scaled it so
that the maximal deviation from zero is the modulus of 1
6
and is inversely proportional to the score. This makes a high RECAI country score translate into a
low country risk factor, which reduces the risk of an investment in this country. Countries that do not appear in the RECAI account for only 3% of total
investments; we assigned them a country risk indicator of + 16 . Fig. 8 shows a sample of country risk factor time series.
Fig. 8. Country risk factor calculated from RECAI ranking for
selected countries.
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